Speaking of Creation:
Modes of Doctrinal Exposition in Torrance and Tanner
by John Drury
What is the doctrine of
creation? What does it mean when
Christians say God created the world out of nothing? How are we to speak of creation? Thomas Torrance and Kathryn Tanner both offer
unique responses to these questions. A
close reading reveals a great deal about the creation as well as how doctrines
are explained. Torrance and Tanner’s
similar conclusions about the doctrine come to them by radically dissimilar
ways. This paper aims to analyze and
assess what they gain or lose along the way.
In
their expositions of the doctrine of creation, Torrance and Tanner hold in
common a purpose and a pattern. Their
common purpose is to increase the credibility of the doctrine by means of ad
hoc apologetics. They explain the
meaning of the doctrine, and even block arguments against it.[i] Their common pattern is the relationship of
God and the world as expressed by the doctrine.
They speak of a transcendent yet creative God, and also the integrity of
creation. Torrance refers to this
integrity as contingent order and freedom, while Tanner calls it created
efficacy.[ii] They also speak of the interaction of God and
creation as different levels or orders.[iii]
The
one major difference between the two is that Torrance draws a close connection
between the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the incarnation. It is on this basis alone that he argues for
the above pattern. Despite her similar
pattern, Tanner does not draw on Christology in order to center the doctrine of
creation. Why is this so? I submit that their different methodological
commitments regarding truth, doctrine and argumentation lead them down these
divergent paths.
To
argue my case, I will first overview Torrance and Tanner’s exposition of the
doctrine of creation. The common pattern
and some of their methodological differences will unfold throughout the
overview. This overview will be followed
by an examination and evaluation of their respective theories of truth,
approaches to doctrine and modes of argumentation.
I.
Torrance and Tanner’s Exposition of the Doctrine
A. Thomas F. Torrance
In
Divine and Contingent Order (1979), Torrance aims to clarify the
“notions of contingence and contingent order.”[iv] Scientists, more than theologians, constitute
his intended audience.[v] This is especially the case since contingency
has received increased credibility in the context of modern science. Torrance wishes to reintroduce the uniquely
Christian notion of contingent order into these favorable conditions, and
contends that must science must necessarily presume it.
What
is the meaning of the terms “contingence” and “contingent order?” Something that is contingent has no necessity
or stability of its own. The Christian
doctrine of creation applies the descriptive predicate of contingence to the
universe. Furthermore, the universe is
not only contingent, but it has an order of its own. The universe is “not self-sufficient or
ultimately self-explaining but is given a rationality and reliability in its
orderliness.”[vi] Hence Torrance refers to creation as
“contingent order.”
The
notion of contingency modifies the force of the term “order.” The rationality and stability of creation is
fully dependent on God’s rationality.[vii] Because this order is contingent, God’s
interaction with it is entirely free.
The freedom of the universe is therefore also grounded in God’s freedom.[viii] For this reason, creation has only a
“contingent freedom.”[ix] Its freedom is not only contingent, but also
ordered; it is far from arbitrary.[x] Torrance regulates all predicates for
creation by the notion of contingent order.
Torrance
exposits the doctrine of creation as contingent order by a historical narration
of its prominence in various contexts.
He first points to its rise in opposition to Greek mind. The ancient Greeks could not formulate this
notion of contingence without some kind of necessity lurking behind it. Nicene Christianity solved this problem with
“a radical doctrine of creation.”[xi] The radicalization was possible “through
thinking out ... the relation of the creation to the incarnation of God’s
Word.”[xii] The doctrine of incarnation implies the rational
integrity of the physical world.
Although there is an asymmetrical and irreversible relation between the
two,[xiii]
God and creation represent two kinds of rational order.
Torrance
traces the struggles this idea faced throughout history. The medieval period saw a hangover of Greek
science that diminished its understanding of contingency. The greatest damage, however, came after Newton. The world-view perpetuated in the wake of his
work was mechanistic and deterministic.
Necessity once again ruled the scientific understanding of the
universe.
Only
in the modern period has a notion of contingence been regained. Torrance points to Einstein’s work as
crucial. Einstein moved away from the
necessities of Newton to a more open world-view. He reminded science that “its internal
consistency must finally depend on relation to an objective ground of
rationality beyond the boundaries of the contingent universe itself.”[xiv] Einstein understood the universe as
dynamically rational rather than statically causal; “in terms of reasons rather
than causes.”[xv] Therefore, Einstein reintroduced the notion
of contingent order to modern science.
Torrance
goes on to argue that contingency is a tacit presupposition of natural science
and even an essential belief.[xvi] This has been established by modern science
in its encounter with the boundaries of its own knowledge. Although it operates with a methodological
secularism,[xvii]
science will nevertheless face theological questions. Torrance explains this phenomenon by the two
facets of contingency: it points both toward and away from God.[xviii] Theological science is concerned with the
former orientation, natural science the latter.[xix] Although each is its own autonomous enterprise,
the study of one will necessarily impinge on the other. The two facets of contingency, therefore,
form the basis of dialogue between science and theology.[xx]
Torrance
concludes with a turn to the question of disorder and evil. A belief in the orderliness of creation
renders the presence of disorder problematic.[xxi] Torrance insists that disorder is not just a
part of contingency or a privation of ordered goodness;[xxii]
rather, he takes his cue from Karl Barth to speak of
evil as anti-being.[xxiii] The disruption of contingent order sets the
two facets of contingence at variance with one another.[xxiv] In the face of this disorder, God is
overruling. God overrules by the
interaction of higher levels with lower levels.[xxv] Humanity is the focal point of this
interaction. Torrance refers to this as
humanity’s priestly and redemptive role.[xxvi] Humanity, too, is in need of redemption, and
so God became incarnate in Jesus Christ to reorder humanity.[xxvii] On the basis of this healing, humans may
perform their mission to the rest of the creation.[xxviii]
B. Kathryn Tanner
Tanner’s
1988 work, God and Creation in Christian Theology, “concerns Christian
talk about God as an agent in relation to created beings, particularly those
assumed to have their own power and efficacy.”[xxix] She is responding to the charge that such
talk is incoherent. Tanner proposes that
if theologians follow the historic rules of discourse, this charge will be
dropped.
Tanner’s
methodological sophistication is remarkable.
She begins with a thorough explanation and defense of her project. She plans to study historical cases in order
to “isolate ruled structures” of theological discourse.[xxx] Her attention is on theological language rather
than the object of theological discourse, such as God and creation.[xxxi] Such a linguistic turn is justified by an apophatic posture toward theological language. If talk about God is informational vacuous,
then a focus on formal rather than material concerns is appropriate.[xxxii] Under this linguistic emphasis, the
theologian’s task is to regulate Christian language. This regulation will ensure speaker’s
attitudes and actions are proper.[xxxiii]
Tanner
locates the problem in speaking of creation in the apparent incoherence of the
doctrine of creation.[xxxiv] It is difficult to understand how God’s
all-pervasion agency does not preclude the agency of humans. She utilizes Kant’s first type of
transcendental argument to establish the conditions of possibility for
particular statements.[xxxv] Tanner’s goal is to exhibit the internal
coherence of Christian talk so that its affirmations will gain credibility.[xxxvi]
Tanner’s
exposition plays out in three movements: (1) God’s transcendence and creative
agency, (2) God and creaturely agency, and (3) the modern breakdown of this
discourse. In the first movement, Tanner
explains the doctrine of creation as a solution to Greek philosophical
problems. To the Greeks, divinity was
either too closely identified with the world or too sharply contrasted with it.[xxxvii] Christian theology affirmed both God’s
transcendence and involvement in the world.
Such an affirmation can be coherent as long as God’s transcendence is
not defined “contrastively.”[xxxviii] God is above the distinctions within the
created order and therefore may be fully involved in the world without becoming
a part of it. Tanner concludes with two
rules for discourse: “avoid both a simple univocal attribution of predicates to
God and world and a simple contrast of divine and non-divine predicates” and
“avoid in talk about God’s creative agency all suggestions of limitation in
scope or manner.”[xxxix] Tanner points to exemplars of this coherent
talk in Irenaeus, Tertullian,
Aquinas and Barth.
In
the second movement, Tanner turns to coherence of Christian talk about God’s
unlimited agency and the efficacy of creatures.
The same two rules apply in this case.[xl] Since God and creatures are not defined in
opposition, a creature may have its own power and efficacy without diminishing
the unlimited agency of God.[xli] Tanner unearths a subset of four rules for
this situation: (1) “The theologian should talk of created efficacy as
immediately and entirely grounded in the creative agency of God,”[xlii]
(2) “God’s agency is not to be talked about as partial, or as composed or mixed
with created causality,”[xliii]
(3) prohibit “talk about the influence of divine agency as any sort of working
on created operations already in act,”[xliv]
and (4) created agency cannot influence divine agency in any strong sense.[xlv] Tanner envisions these rules as “resources of
complexity.”[xlvi] There is a positive side of the rules that
affirms the efficacy of creatures, as well as a negative side that reminds us
that the creature is radically dependent on God. The two sides of the rules explain the
presence of theological diversity: different theologians can be identified as
emphasizing different sides of the rules depending on their context, method or
practical agenda.[xlvii]
Tanner’s
third and final movement discusses the modern breakdown of the coherency of
Christian talk. Major problems have
emerged in the modern context that theology has been unable to overcome. The first is the “emphasis on the referential
adequacy of discourse.”[xlviii] Theologians are tempted by modern rationalism
to treat their language about God as actual descriptions of God. The result is theologians stress either the
negative side of the rules so that God’s agency precludes human agency (determinism), or the positive side so that human activity is
entirely independent of God (Pelagianism).[xlix] Modern theology has been predominately Pelagian in its orientation.[l] Tanner proposes a strategy for faithfulness
in response: theologians must block Pelagianism by
use of the negative side of the rules.[li] Only on this basis can theologians then
affirm the efficacy of creatures by the positive side of rules.[lii]
II.
Truth, Doctrine and Argumentation
As
the above overview shows, Torrance and Tanner arrive at similar conclusions
regarding the doctrine of creation. God
is transcendent and an all-pervasive agent, yet creation has
its own integrity and order. The
overview begins to indicate the different paths each take to reach such conclusions. For the sake of understanding, I will now
explore the commitments that lead these two theologians down divergent
paths. The commitments are their
theories of truth, approaches to doctrine, and resultant modes of
argumentation. For the purpose of evaluation,
I will examine the approximate success of each author at connecting his or her
notion of creation with Jesus Christ.
A. Theories of Truth
What
could be more basic than one’s theory of truth?
If Torrance and Tanner ascribe the same sentences to God and creation
yet subscribe to different theories of truth, then they are not actually saying
the same thing. Both indicate their
theories of truth at the outset.
Torrance places himself “in the tradition of Scottish realist” thought,[liii]
while Tanner describes her work as having a “pragmatist focus.”[liv]
What
does it mean for Torrance to call himself a realist? Simply put, realism believes in the
referential correspondence between a statement and reality. Such semantic realism can be found in
Torrance’s criticism of Satre. For Sartre, the notion of contingence is
deprived of “any semantic reference to intelligibility beyond itself,” and
therefore the universe is left in disorder.[lv] Torrance thinks it necessary for contingence
to have a real reference to the rational order.
He therefore praises Einstein’s “new realism in science” in contrast to
some forms of quantum theory.[lvi] For Torrance, real cognitive and referential
knowledge is possible.[lvii]
Torrance’s
realism can be contrasted to Tanner’s pragmatism. Tanner places great weight on the rhetorical
function of theology. A theological
statement “recommends certain attitudes and actions.”[lviii] A theological statement is therefore subject
to critique for its “potentially harmful practical consequences for Christian behaviours and attitudes.”[lix] In certain contexts, then, a typically true
statement would actually be false.[lx] According to Tanner, the primary referent of
a theologian’s talk is the religious language of Christians, so that
theological language about divine activity refers to the speaker as much if not
more than to God.
A
pragmatic focus does not commit one to an anti-realist position. It would be possible to simply accentuate the
pragmatic import of realistically true statements. Such a mediating position, however, is not
found in Tanner. She explicitly
contrasts her pragmatism with more realist theories of truth. She follows Lindbeck’s
reading of Aquinas to argue that humans must remain agnostic about the modus
significandi of theological statements.[lxi] She also critiques the modern period’s appeal
for adequate reference in theological discourse.[lxii] Although Tanner does not criticize Torrance
directly, such a criticism would necessarily apply to Torrance’s realism.
Tanner’s
pragmatism is theologically justified by her appeal to analogical
language. Does Torrance’s realism
violate this theological posture?
Torrance is not so literal that he ignores the relevance of mystery for
theological language. He calls himself a
“critical realist.”[lxiii] He asserts the incomprehensibility of contingence.[lxiv] Theology offers only a partial account of
that which is “mysterious and baffling.”[lxv] For Torrance, revelation is so closely
identified with the incarnation that he easily comprehends the analogical
nature of theological language. Torrance
is a case in point that an apophatic theological
posture does not necessitate a pragmatic theory of truth.
How
do these divergent theories of truth shape Tanner and Torrance’s doctrinal
exposition? For Torrance, speaking of
creation involves the natural sciences.
Since theological language realistically refers to God and the world,
science and theology make reference to the same universe.[lxvi] He claims that science and theology share in
the same God-given rationality.[lxvii] Tanner, on the other hand, does not discuss
modern empirical science at all. Such a
dialogue is unnecessary if theological truth is pragmatic.
If
we can roughly categorize Torrance as a realist and Tanner as a pragmatist, how
can we weigh their theological projects?
Although they are both explaining the doctrine of creation and making
very similar affirmations, they are referring to two different things. When Torrance is speaking of creation, he
refers to God and the created order.
When Tanner speaks of creation, she is referring to people’s language
and corresponding forms of life. A
‘common sense’ evaluation would favor Torrance, for it seems reasonable that
when one speaks of creation he or she is referring to creation.
However,
a more explicitly theological evaluation can be made. Can either make a serious connection between
the doctrine of creation and the center of Christian theology, Jesus
Christ? Torrance makes this very move:
revealed knowledge about creation is rooted in the actuality of the incarnation.[lxviii] He can make this move because the contingent
order defined by the doctrine of creation refers to the same order into which
God becomes incarnate. For Tanner,
theological statements ultimately refer to the speaker and not the object. Therefore, there is little basis for turning
to the incarnation as a source for solving theological problems. She is able to hammer out a coherent doctrine
of creation without connection to the incarnation.
B. Approaches to Doctrine
Since
Tanner and Torrance are explaining a doctrine, it is crucial to determine their
approach to doctrine. How does each
define doctrine? What do they think
doctrines say? How do they use
doctrine? Torrance treats doctrines as
substantive truth-claims. They carry
actual information, and can be used as basic or maximal beliefs. Tanner, on the other hand, approaches
doctrines as rules. They are formal
placeholders to regulate religious talk.
They perform a prohibiting and minimalist function.
Torrance’s
view of doctrine is rooted in his realist theory of truth. Doctrines are permitted to refer to
reality. This material mode is
Torrance’s primary use of doctrines. The
doctrine of creation conveys information that describes the universe as a
contingent order. However, this apparent
positivism is tempered by the doctrine’s grounding in the transcendent
rationality of God.[lxix] Its cognitive content is rooted in the God’s
own knowledge, and therefore not the property of doctrines per se.
Tanner
extends George Lindbeck’s rule theory of
doctrine. Doctrinal exposition and
theological discourse can be mined, she claims, for rules. Unlike the material mode of doctrine, these
formal rules are universal.[lxx] They are “place-holders” that can be filled
with material, linguistic content in particular situations.[lxxi] Their primary function is to regulate the way
Christians speak. A theologian does not
gain information from doctrines, but rather uncovers and executes rules so that
Christian speech is faithful and coherent.
Is
Tanner’s approach to doctrine sharply distinct from Torrance’s? Could it be that they are merely two sides of
the same coin? One might utilize the
regulative function of doctrines without disparaging their material
content. However, Tanner regards
doctrines as informationally vacuous.[lxxii] Even when doctrines are formulated
substantively, their function is regulative: “Statements in a first-order mode
that work as rules are often instantiations or applications of the rules for
discourse; they work as rules by becoming paradigmatic instances of a rule’s
use.”[lxxiii] Tanner is not simply adding to the material
side of doctrines a formal corollary; she is supplanting it.
Must
the regulative function of doctrine overtake the informative mode? Can a doctrine be both material and
formal? Although Torrance’s primary mode
of doctrinal exposition is material, he is capable of making formal, ruled use
of doctrines. To explain the relation of
God to the universe, he turns to revelation in its “concrete form of Jesus
Christ” in order to “formulate and test such statements.”[lxxiv] The difference is that the material actuality
grounds the formal rule. The incarnation
is a rule because it is true; it is a heuristic device not instead but because
of its substantive status. God,
therefore, is the regulator of knowledge: “our knowledge of him is controlled
beyond itself in the rationality of God.”[lxxv] Torrance could incorporate the methodological
sophistication of Tanner’s rule studies, but nevertheless retain the material
content of doctrines.
Once
again, Torrance’s commitments allow and even encourage the connection between
the incarnation and the doctrine of creation.
Tanner’s minimalist approach to doctrine, on the other hand, limits such
a connection. If the doctrine of
creation is a rule for talk, then one ought to be able to talk coherently about
God and the world without turning to the Christological center of
theology. Tanner believes such a Christocentric turn is another way of doing the same thing:
“Karl Barth uses the unity of God and humanity in
Jesus Christ as a rule.”[lxxvi] In her recent book, Jesus, Humanity and
the Trinity, Tanner does make the connection, yet in the opposite
direction: she uses the rules of the doctrine of creation to solve
Christological conundrums. She admits this is strange, but nevertheless gives
preference to the general over the particular.[lxxvii]
Torrance,
on the other hand, draws extensively on the tie between the doctrines of
creation and incarnation.[lxxviii] The two doctrines have overlapping material
content, and so the one necessarily sheds light on the other. Torrance borrows Norman Kempt Smith’s concept
of a “maximum belief.” The belief in
contingence commits Christians to the belief that all the acts of God are
contingent. Yet such a belief is
actually grounded in those very acts.[lxxix] The content of doctrine is thus rooted in the
actuality of the incarnation. Torrance
makes this connection as serious and tight as possible.
A
weakness in Torrance may be noted at this point by way of excursus. Although he makes the aforementioned
connection serious and tight, it is incomplete.
Why? He gives disproportionate
weight to the incarnation within the story of Jesus. Although the incarnation could serve as shorthand
for the whole narrative of Jesus, Torrance’s soteriology
indicates that such is not the case. His
preferred metaphor for salvation is healing.[lxxx] If we are to understand the doctrine of
creation by its center in Jesus Christ, then the whole of Jesus’ story must be
taken into account. Creation is not only
affirmed (incarnation), but also negated (crucifixion), and only then
reconstituted (resurrection).[lxxxi]
C. Modes of Argumentation
Tanner
and Torrance clearly have divergent commitments regarding truth and
doctrine. What do these commitments
imply for their modes of argumentation?
What do they aim to show in their exposition of the doctrine of
creation? How do they go about their
task?
Torrance’s
realist theory of truth and material approach to doctrine does not lead him to
simply repristinate theology. He aims to clarify the contingence in the
context of modern science. Such an
explanation is not meant to be systematic or strongly apologetic. He does not ‘prove’ the doctrine. Furthermore, he allows for the “baffling” and
“incomprehensible” character of contingence.[lxxxii] Since the basis of truth is God’s rationality
and not human discourse, Torrance is able to cope with paradox.
Tanner
aims to exhibit the coherence of Christian discourse. She wants to solve apparent
inconsistencies. Although her apophatic stance leads her to a strong minimalist position
on truth and doctrine, she demands thoroughgoing coherence from theological
discourse. There is an apologetic slant
to her work, for she hopes a coherent doctrine will gain public credibility.[lxxxiii] This is not an ad hoc apologetics of
simply explaining the internal meaning of a doctrine. Properly regulated theological statements for
her are “not merely logically consistent.... They imply one another and
therefore meet requirements for a stronger kind of intelligibility, systematic
coherence.”[lxxxiv] This systematic orientation renders her averse
to paradox.
The
difference between Torrance and Tanner’s modes of argumentation can be
exemplified by the divergent philosophical categories they employ. When discussing the breaking point or
boundary of scientific knowledge, Torrance turns to Godel:
What is needed is something like a Godelian
theorem of the universe as an intelligible whole or of the scientific
enterprise as an intelligible whole, but that would still not carry us on to
the actual transcendent ground from which all our intramundane
knowledge would gain its ultimate consistence or coherence.[lxxxv]
Torrance agrees with Godel that consistence and completeness are mutually
exclusive.[lxxxvi]
In
contrast, Tanner favors Kant’s transcendental arguments. Her expressed purpose is to determine the
conditions for possibility to form coherent statements.[lxxxvii] Tanner violates Godel’s
proof by the strong declaration of both the consistence and systematic
coherence of theological discourse.[lxxxviii] Tanner’s insightful exposition is minimally
referential or material, while being maximally coherentist. Maybe she could have carved logical space for
mystery in her exposition of the doctrine of creation.
Tanner
may have thought drawing too strongly on the particular mystery of the
incarnation would have spoiled her stress on coherence. Torrance’s mode of argumentation, on the
other hand, allows him to connect creation and Jesus Christ. He rests ultimate rationality and coherence
on God’s shoulders. The condition for
possibility is not the coherence of theological discourse but the actuality of
the incarnation. His doctrinal exposition
is an exercise in ‘thinking after,’ for the incarnation is “unthinkable except
on the ground its actual happening has established.”[lxxxix] Such a methodological appreciation for
mystery is expressed well by Hans Frei:
The Incarnation of God in Christ does not belong to a
general ‘meaning’ class, including ‘paradox’ ... it is not a logical
contradiction--How it is possible for a person to be once human and
divine is not intrinsically irrational, but the condition of its
possibility, or rationality, is one we cannot know in this present finite
state.[xc]
Conclusion
On
the basis of these radically different commitments, Torrance and Tanner try to
make common affirmations about the doctrine of creation. Torrance’s realist theory of truth, material
approach to doctrine, and Godelian-paradox mode of
argumentation are all in sharp distinction to Tanner’s pragmatism,
formal-regulative approach to doctrine, and strong Kantian-coherentist
argumentation. Since truth, doctrine and
logic are such basic matters, whatever they hold in common is nearly
nullified. As we saw, it is Tanner’s
method that gives up too much. Torrance
could learn much from her while holding on to his commitments. The insights of Tanner’s study could also be
reaped if her polemics were softened.
The pragmatic and formal do not need to replace the realistic and
material. Finally, the strength of
Torrance’s position is revealed by the Christocentric
connections his method allows, for what good is a Christian doctrine of
creation if it does not refer to Christ?
Fall 2002
[i] Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998) xii, 21;
Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1988) 25, 164.
[lvii] For more on critical realism, see George Hunsinger, “Postliberal Theology” in upcoming Cambridge companion to Postliberal theology, p. 5-10.
[lxi] Tanner, God and Creation 12; see also George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1984) 66-67.
[lxxiv] Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order 108; he also speaks of contingence serving a regulative function for natural science, p. 74.
[lxxxi] see George Hunsinger, How To Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 85, 98.